G. N. Appell
Brandeis University

Sanjek, Roger (ed.) Fieldnotes: The Makings of Anthropology. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990, xviii + 429 pp. Including chapter references and index. $42.50 cloth, $12.95 paper.

Fluehr-Lobban, Carolyn. Ethics and the Profession of Anthropology: Dialogue for a New Era. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991, xiii + 297 pp. including chapter references, appendices, and index. $31.95 cloth.

American anthropology has lost its center and is in disarray. This is shown in the preoccupation with ethical discourse, the intrusion of moral justifications into theoretical arguments, and the rush to find new metaphors for research and organizing data, which includes grasping at literary straws. Thus in Fieldnotes Sanjek can write (pp. 408-9) “The answer must not be just to append, edit, transcribe, or co-create the writings of informants. We must break each of the four legs of WMWM [western/middle-class/white/male] anthropology and radically widen the discipline’s membership...” And “today the promise and premise of a world anthropology in its liberal or more radical universality is visible reality. Other-fucking in its more vulgar forms [I am not sure how it can be more vulgar!] is drawing to a close” (p. 40-41). As Sanjek buys into this very American need to conflate sex with aggression (cf. Appell 1991), his concern with bias in field reporting seems empty and not very reflexive. This is particularly so when he claims that the new wave of the future is the “ethnographic” writing of the former subjects of research who are now doing it without the encumbrance of the dichotomy between self and other (Hallowell, where are you when we need you?). Are they any less biased? Has the professional ethnographer been without any theoretical and methodological clothes all these years? What then is the need for graduate fieldwork training? What then is the need for a volume examining the nature of ethnographic fieldnotes?

Thus, anthropology today has some amusing contradictions. One finds both scholars and true believers. But the boundaries between these two subsets are sometimes blurred with the members of each frequently jumping from one to the other even in the middle of an article. This helps to explain the unrelenting rise and death of fashions in American anthropological inquiry and its apparent lack of scholarly development. For the “answer” to anthropological questions are revealed to true believers by claimants of new paradigms, new metaphors that solve everything. The past can then be swept away without review other than scorn and a fresh start made. Frequently the claims of true believers become more shrill the closer there is an impending decision on tenure or academic position.

But why do scholars permit this? Is there something in the American psyche that needs new beginnings or that needs new heroes to paper over cognitive contradictions? This trend seems to have been exacerbated by the shift in economics that has infected the character of the anthropological endeavor itself. One of the original goals of anthropological inquiry in attempting to understand the human condition was to rescue threatened and disappearing cultures. These, of importance in themselves, would also provide data on human nature, its capacities and limits, material to understand the nature of culture and its processes, and information on forces leading to the formation of cultures. But this focus on salvage ethnography was supplanted with the rise of the National Science Foundation. Now the focus is on theory, on answering the problems of American society or contradictions in the Western condition on the backs of indigenous peoples.

The harm that this does to ethnography is discussed by Allen and Orna Johnson. They decry the shift from the holistic approach of ethnography to a more scientific paradigm with tight deductive research designs and an emphasis on theory. Unfortunately, the holism argument is not cogently phrased. The more fundamental issue is the development of system models of various sociocultural domains, which has proven more productive than a simple holism of patterns and configurations (see Appell 1973a). But their argument that such focused research designs are reductionistic, resulting in the loss of context and relevant data to the profession as a whole is right to the point. Margery Wolf in her essay on her relationship to her fieldnotes over several decades of research on Chinese women and the family reaches similar conclusions. She argues that the anthropologist who goes into the field with a circumscribed problem and a clear picture of the kind of data to collect for a quick dissertation sacrifices the opportunity to return to the fieldnotes to ask different questions, to search for solutions to conflicting explanations, and to add to the general ethnographic literature.

This also has implications for those peoples whose societies we study. Robert Smith (p. 369) argues for the necessity of keeping the voice of the ethnographer down and decries the view of fieldwork as a rite of passage: “The implication is demeaning to people who deserve more respect; the transformation of our informants into hapless victims of alleged careerist machinations is the high price we pay when we stop writing anthropology and start writing about it and ourselves. The subjects of ethnographies, it should never be forgotten, are always more interesting than their authors.”

Simon Ottenberg draws similar conclusions in his discussion of the changing relationship of over thirty years to his fieldnotes and the anthropological discipline. One of his most trenchant points is that

cultural relativism has been replaced by textual relativism. We have moved from ideas of the relativism of the cultures of the people we study to concepts of the relativity of interpretation and the interpreter. That is possible because we have moved from employing scientific metaphors, particularly those relating to organic qualities... to using humanistic metaphors drawn largely from literature, literary criticism, history, and drama.... Fieldnotes have gone from being viewed as scientific data to being seen as interpretive text.... Anthropology has shifted from questions of the accuracy of the data in the notes to matters of how one interprets them as text. Now everything is interpretation.... But it is also part of present Western society’s preoccupation with the self, a narcissism in which the ‘native’ becomes secondary, while concern with our anthropological and personal processes becomes primary. pp. 156–157)
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This brings us to Clifford’s contribution in Fieldnotes, which can be passed over with no loss as it unfortunately supports the prejudice that much of literary criticism is not a scholarly pursuit. It really is too bad he is not more familiar with the anthropological literature and so uninformed about anthropological theory and the ethnographic endeavor, for he has had some influence. A reappraisal of Clifford’s much referred to article “On Ethnographic Authority” is warranted here as it forms the foundation of argument in many of the articles in Fieldnotes. I refer here to the revised version appearing in Clifford (1988).

First, is the metaphor of fieldnotes as text and ethnographic writing as interpretation either unique or enlightening? All scholarly inquiry involves textual materials — whether it is the chemist writing up his lab notes, the anthropologist writing down his sensory observations, the historian making notes on the documents he reads, or Clifford taking notes for his writings on anthropology. So the view of fieldnotes as texts leads us nowhere if we do not take the next step to analyze the mode of interpretation that authors of these texts themselves use. Literary interpretation is not the only mode, nor should it necessarily be privileged. It is just as important to ascertain how evidence is marshalled, what is the logic of the argument, what is selected, what is overlooked, what reality is being defined.

Second, Clifford’s argument is based on the analysis of types. Any inquiry that depends on the selection of a type to represent the whole is weak and the argument unsubstantiated unless evidence is produced as to how types are selected and the degree to which they are representative. Clifford avoids this. An example of the failure of type analysis in his original article is his argument that participant-observation, as used in several ethnographies he has selected, produces experiential authority that is based only on intuition, aesthetic and/or divinatory styles of comprehension, and as a result produces naive claims. Does he really believe ethnographic inquiry proceeds in this manner? Has he ever been in the field with a skilled ethnographer? His knowledge of the literature on fieldwork appears to be rather superficial.

The biased selection of types can lead one into intellectual quicksand. Another blatant misuse of types and the bias this produces occurs in his Fieldnotes contribution. He analyzes a photograph of Malinowski in the field to typify how fieldwork was being done without establishing how representative it is. And from the spatial relations depicted he reads into it interpretations of intent and relationships indicative of the fieldwork process without knowing the meaning of the spatial relations to the participants themselves and without knowing the original purpose of the photographer. Surely this is not scholarship!
Third, for narrative coherence he organizes his types along a time line in which he imputes both covertly and overtly the notion of progress, a very Western mode of organization.

This time line could, on the other hand, involve degeneration, in terms of loss of knowledge, but that possibility is ignored. Furthermore, this implies an independent reality against which accounts can be judged as to their validity, which undermines his argument. But this “progress” could also represent only a shift of problem, with no improvement or degeneration in methods of obtaining knowledge. For example, he applauds developments in the use of informants’ texts little realizing that the collection of texts may also represent either a stage in an inquiry or the fact that the sociocultural system is no longer operating and texts are one of the remaining sources of information. Thus, what he ignores, and which is ignored by most of the contributors to this book, is the fact that knowledge is the product of interests in the broadest sense, of problems raised, of questions posed, of novelty encountered, of a multitude of constraints and contingencies in each piece of fieldwork. Unless that is factored into the analysis, criticisms of anthropological writing and fieldnotes are limp.

There is a down side to the current emphasis on textual analysis and interpretation, since this is not approached from a reflexive position and is based primarily on literary modes of criticism. It permits many to avoid the hard work of framing hypotheses, clearly defining the problem to be examined, selecting relevant questions to be put, marshalling of the resultant data, using controls to minimize cultural bias, collecting quantitative data, all of which are involved in disciplined fieldwork. And it ignores other modes of analysis and interpretation of texts of data, privileging only that of literary criticism.

One of the marks of scholarship of any kind is a knowledge of the literature in the field, but this seems lacking in those concerned with textual analysis in Fieldnotes. For example, in the discussions of bias, never a mention is made to the methods used in ethnosemantic inquiries to eliminate bias (see Werner and Fenton 1973 for a review of this) or the classic work of Devereux (1967) on countertransference in ethnographic inquiry. Plath in his interesting essay, which also raises the problems and importance of filework on return from the field, also makes this important point: “the jackleg preachers of ‘reflexivity’ and ‘sensory ethnography’ should be invited to do a little more homework in the history of their discipline” (p. 383). And Simon Ottenberg (p. 157) writes that “despite the ridicule of past scholarship which marks much of social and cultural anthropology today, we can... make use of our own scholarly past if we are sensitive to the nature of our anthropological texts, their complexities and limitations.”

But historical truth appears to be the first casualty of the battle over the soul of anthropology. The editor, who himself contributed approximately 45% of the material to Fieldnotes, at times appears to be antifoundationalist and cynically skeptical. He refers to Lévi-Strauss’s statement, now often deprecated by the politically correct, on the rewards of being the first white man to visit a native community as an example of “romantic Western self-inflations.” Sanjek claims that this involves both racist and sexist conventions which “were dying — if slowly — by the 1930s...” (p. 39). And he naively argues that the present reality is that everywhere the subjects of anthropological inquiry can read and write fieldnotes. Yet, for example, there are large areas of Southeast Asia where this is not true, and where indigenous cultures have not been recorded and are rapidly dying. But even before World War II anthropologists were studying literate communities.

However, the problematic nature of fieldnotes is a worthy subject of study. And the articles in this book represent the range from scientific realism to relativism. In another chapter entitled “The Secret Life of Fieldnotes” Sanjek probes the nature of fieldnote practice by examining historical developments in the field. This is an extraordinarily useful chapter accompanied by an analytical bibliography of the subject. But with all the talk about bias and the intrusive anthropologist, it is strange that there is no mention of the fieldnote practice in inquiries on ethnoscience. Nor is there reference to the special problems of legal, economic, or ecological anthropological inquiry. Nevertheless this is a useful chapter, although his analysis of the interview has its limitations. Sanjek distinguishes two dimensions: whether the ethnographer comes to the informant or the informant comes to the ethnographer, and who controls the interview. There is an implied bias towards the informant in control on his turf, but surely this depends on the questions being posed, the problem being addressed.

But again the failure to frame the discussion of fieldnotes in terms of the problems posed and the question raised, models used and theories being tested, whether the society is functioning or dying, leaves a major lacuna in this essay. As this is characteristic of other essays, it eventually wounds the book. This failure to consider the focus of the fieldwork also occurs in Jean Jackson’s essay, “a somewhat lighthearted exploration of the emotional dimension” (p. 5) of fieldnotes that summarizes the results of her interview of seventy anthropologists on the subject. This is a very interesting and revealing essay. Two findings are particularly valuable: the ambivalence anthropologists feel toward their fieldnotes and the fact that there is almost no formal instruction given in graduate training in taking fieldnotes. But this chapter also illustrates both the weakness of American anthropology and many of the contributions in the book. There is no stratification of the data in terms of experience, success, frequency of response, type of fieldwork, etc. The material is organized on the basis of what the author selects as typical and in terms more of descriptive integration than analysis.

Lederman explains much of the emotional discomfort Jackson found over fieldnotes in her discussion of the liminality of fieldnotes and their ambiguities. But I think more could be made of fieldnotes as a liminal area, a transition zone, that the anthropologist must constantly traverse, a liminal zone that includes errors, early superficial understandings, and so forth. Lederman also argues to extend the scrutiny of fieldnotes to the “scenes of reading notes” on the ethnographer’s return home in which the “significant work of decontexualizing and recontexualizing cultural categories and idioms takes place” (p. 90).
Obbo presents a very disturbing narrative of her experiences with European anthropologists who have tried to use her research data to further their own careers, treating her as a “research assistant on the cheap,” lying to her, publishing her data without her knowledge, and even breaking into her research files when she was not at home. And she concludes with her experience studying an American community in which she found that few American anthropologists were comfortable with her as a non-Western anthropologist studying an America community. Her essay is the best for understanding that aspect of the ambivalence anthropologists feel over their fieldnotes because of the potential danger they pose to informants if certain information is mishandled or revealed. And she nicely delineates how ethnocentric anthropologists themselves can be and how some anthropologists can be so career driven as to engage in unethical and even illegal behavior.

In their essays Nancy Lutkehaus and Robert Smith discuss the issues of using the fieldnotes of others and the changing relationships to the data that this entails. Lutkehaus in her study of social and economic change on Manam Island made extensive use of the fieldnotes and published articles of Camilla Wedgwood. Her relationship with Wedgwood through her fieldnotes and the changing character of this provides one of the more interesting essays in the volume. Smith discusses how he dealt with the fieldnotes of John and Ella Embree (Wiswell) and the publications that resulted.

Sanjek’s last contribution on ethnographic validity is most useful. He argues, unconvincingly but interestingly, that emphasis on reliability in ethnography verges on an affectation and is not the issue; validity is. And he proposes three canons to test the validity of an ethnography: (1) theoretical candor in which the ethnographer makes explicit his interests; (2) the ethnographer’s path in which the development of informant contacts is made explicit along with how they were made and an assessment of their representativeness; and (3) fieldnote evidence in which the relationship of fieldnotes to the ethnography is made explicit. These are critical points. But he might have added that questions of validity are also raised by a lack of internal consistency in the argument as well as by assertions that have no supporting evidence but which fall beyond the range of expected human behavior or are inconsistent with past ethnographic reports from the region.

What I would like to have seen addressed in this book is how sensory data are transformed into fieldnote text, how these are then selected and transmuted into ethnographic statements, and how anthropological fieldnote taking is different from other forms of data gathering. To do this it would have required some consideration of the large literature on note taking by journalists, by ethologists, by ornithologists, by natural scientists (for example see Herman 1986), etc.

Finally this book raises fundamental questions on the nature of the scholarly endeavor. First, much of the argument revolves around the false dichotomy between scientific and humanistic inquiry. The real issue is the creation and certification of warranted knowledge and what methods are appropriate to what kinds of inquiry at a particular stage of knowledge. Unfortunately, science is frequently viewed as an exercise in generating statistical data and those taking a humanistic stance tend to ignore rules of evidence and argument. Allen and Orna Johnson have a very useful chapter on measurement potentials of ethnographic fieldnotes. They then show how even in humanistic research designs qualitative data can be transformed into quantitative data with the improvement in scholarly argument.

Second, there are examples in this book which cast doubt on a strong relativist program and suggest that relativists in their attack on positivism need to rework their critiques. The program of positivism, which holds that fact and theory are distinguishable, has been ridiculed. It is claimed that there are no immaculate data but that data are thoroughly penetrated by theory and the bias of the researcher, with the degree of penetration charged depending on the degree of relativity espoused by the author. Yet Ottenberg writes “I have found that some of my data, collected with other theories in mind and during a colonial period, can nonetheless be reinterpreted in the present political world and in terms of current theory” (p. 157). And Wolf also writes that her older fieldnotes and those of her husband were amenable to analysis at a later time with different theoretical issues in mind. And then there are the examples of Smith and Lutkehaus finding important data for their ethnographies in the fieldnotes of others, taken at other times, under other conditions, and for other purposes.

Fieldnotes is an interesting and important book, although anyone contemplating fieldwork should consult Ellen (1984), which is more systematic and indispensable.
Ethics and the Profession of Anthropology also deals with the threatened identity of American (U.S.) anthropology and the loss of the moral center. But these authors are not concerned with the moral issue of salvage ethnography. They are primarily interested in issues facing the American profession of anthropology.

At a fundamental level I am not persuaded by arguments using moral discourse for purposes of professional politics. It would have been useful if some of the authors in Ethics had tried to make the distinction between political discourse and ethical discourse. Perhaps there is none. Certainly Chambers deftly points out how ethical discourse is used to create social identities and solidarity, and to establish boundaries between those who are inside and those who are outside. By this process one faction attempts to gain privileged position in control over another faction, and to discourage or exclude anthropologists from participating in areas of behavior, as in nonacademic employment. In other words, ethical discourse as well as regulating behavior in the opportunity structure, as I have noted elsewhere, is frequently used to control access to future resources.

Fluehr-Lobban argues the source of the crises in ethics has been the profound change in the old order in anthropology by the lack of employment opportunities in academia and the continued production of professional anthropologists so that by 1986 there were more anthropologists employed outside academia than inside. The market for traditional anthropologists has been shrinking while the production of trained anthropologists has continued. She provides an historical analysis of the growth and changes in ethical debate in the U.S. anthropological profession, focusing on the various ethical statements of the American Anthropological Association. This is an interesting review, but it seems to lack depth, particularly in dealing with the Vietnam War issues as the defenses made by those accused of unethical behavior are not included or analyzed.

Both Fluehr-Lobban and Berreman attack the proposed revisions of the American Anthropological Association statement on ethics for ignoring the problem of secret and clandestine research. But Chambers makes a good case for a rethinking of this issue. Berreman distinguishes ethical discourse from so-called “realist” arguments of militarists, bureaucrats, and those with economic interests, and warns that such arguments are inappropriate in a profession that deals with truth. In this context he reviews the history of these “realist” defense mechanisms in the American Anthropological Association over anthropological participation in the Vietnam War, how they affected him, and their consequences. Fluehr-Lobban also makes this important point on how bureaucratic the American Anthropological Association has been when confronted with ethical issues, using delaying and cover-up tactics rather than leading the profession. Berreman argues against the evisceration the 1971 Principles of Professional Responsibilities in the draft code of 1984 and the abandonment that this represents of the spirit of ethical practice. While some of his points may not be accepted by all in the profession, we are fortunate to have such an ethically sensitive individual to force us to consider such issues.

What has caused this identity crisis in American anthropology? Is it really the demographic expansion that has required the search for new positions outside academia? Has there been a different bias in the applications and selection of graduate students? Was the rapid expansion in departments giving the Ph.D. in the 1960s and 1970s in response more to internal rather than external market conditions? And has this resulted in a lowering of standards so that the identity crisis is partially the product of inadequate training? Or has this identity crisis been purposely constructed by those seeking power and position on the basis of this? I suspect that all these have been factors.

That very real ethical issues exist. In his contribution Hakken argues that there is a diversity of ethical thinking in the profession as well as an employment crises, and our ethical difficulties derive from philosophical confusions regarding what ethics should be. He argues that we have to develop an effective ethical culture within the discipline but the American Anthropological Association has failed to take the leadership in this.

Jay Szklut and Robert Reed in a pertinent and useful essay address the ethical dilemmas that arise from the demands of publication and reassess and revise the traditional ethical principle of protection of the community of research by anonymity. John Halsey reviews the current situation for the proper ethical and legal practice of archeology in the state of Michigan.

William Graves and Mark Shields, in a well thought out essay on the nature of ethical codes, argue that they are based on a conceptualization of social life as a game of control, contributing to the view that conflict is an inevitable consequence of differences. Ethical discourse should be based on a more positive set of ideas than control, harm, and protection. Furthermore, social scientists do not have that kind of authority and control over their research to guarantee that the rights of subjects are protected, nor do they control the research process independent of the interests and actions of others. Research, as any social relation, has an emergent character, and one never knows what the effects of the feedback of results might be, particularly in contract research. They argue for a dialogic conception of moral responsibility in which an attempt is made to understand and accommodate a plurality of perspectives and definitions in research.

Barbara Frankel and M. G. Trend question whether anthropology is not developing two cultures and whether a single code of ethics is still appropriate. And they compare the differences in the cultures of academic and nonacademic anthropologists and the implications of these for a code of ethics.

Jean Gilbert, Nathanial Tashima, and Claudia Fishman’s very informative essay discusses the issues behind the development of the ethical guidelines for the National Association of Practicing Anthropologists, enlarging on the problems faced by nonacademically employed anthropologists.

In the final chapter Fluehr-Lobban provides an excellent summary of the ethical issues raised in the book and discusses them in the light of the new realities within the anthropological profession. A series of appendices contain the various enacted and proposed codes of ethics for the American Anthropological Association, the Society for Applied Anthropology, the Society of Professional Archaeologists, and the National Association of Practicing Anthropologists.

However, to understand some of the basic issues in our ethical dilemmas I believe our relationship with informants needs greater scrutiny. It is not enough just to state, as the present AAA code does, that our first responsibility is to protect the dignity and privacy of the people who provide information. Our ethnographic interview is unique in that it has similarities to the psychiatric relationship, but at the same time the data we obtain are to be made public or used in a public fashion, whatever the public. We establish trust and understanding, and then in a way violate this by turning the healing emotion of understanding into data, objectifying the other. Certainly, some of our ethical confusions and the ambivalence we feel over fieldnotes result from our failure to define that relationship better.

I also come away with the unresolved question of why nonacademically employed anthropologists want an anthropological identity by having an ethical code that is responsive to their interests. What competitive advantage is there to be identified as anthropologists in the nontraditional occupations? Or does this identification have something to say about how these individuals want to place themselves in terms of their own larger culture?

But what should be the moral grounds for ethics in the profession of anthropology? The values of our own society? Is this not slightly ethnocentric? Is this not why discussions of ethics are frequently so culture bound and uninformed by anthropological theory? I am constantly amazed that discourse on ethics in the anthropological profession seems strangely unenlightened by the theories and methods we apply to other societies, which tends to suggest we do not really believe our own theories of behavior when applied to ourselves (see Appell 1973b). But anthropological knowledge about social processes can at least provide a partial base for a code of ethics.

As anthropological grounds for starting a discussion of ethical behavior, I would be concerned that anthropological inquiry not cause any social disintegration in the community of research. To phrase it in another way, anthropologists as a result of their research should not add to the adaptation load of any society or individual, either by destroying trust, increasing conflict, eroding beliefs, or lowering self-esteem. The veil of public secrecy should not be pierced, as this interferes with social processes; and intervention in the system of distributive justice should not be engaged in unless such actions would improve the adaptive capacity of first the society and then the individuals. But I have spoken about this before (Appell 1989).

Finally, one of the founding pillars of our profession was the concern over recording the cultures of the world before they disappeared under successive waves of “modernization” not only for their contributions to knowledge but for the very peoples themselves. Those American anthropologists who have been swept into the postmodern eddy of this flood of modernity and who now from that position accuse ethnography of being part of that flood seem to have forgotten our history and have abandoned unfinished the very critical antimodernist program of salvage ethnography. This program required the elimination of ethnocentric bias and the development both of better theoretical tools for ensuring that our data reflected cultural reality and better questions to ask to increase our understanding of social processes. What has happened to this centering ethos? Why is salvage ethnography no longer one of our concerns? Was that not an ennobling and transcendent endeavor? And is not the loss of this the cause of our identity crisis? Murdock and Lévi-Strauss, as well as other major theoretical thinkers, have all claimed that the most important contribution that anthropology has to make is its ethnographic record of these disappearing and lost worlds. Would not a return to this again make anthropology the vibrant discipline it once was? Isn’t this one of the reasons anthropologists not employed in anthropological positions want to maintain their identity with the profession?

REFERENCES CITED

Appell, G. N.
1973a The Distinction Between Ethnography and Ethnology and Other Issues in Cognitive Structuralism, Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 129:1-56.

1973b Basic Issues in the Dilemmas and Ethical Conflicts in Anthropological Inquiry. Module 19. New York: MSS Modular Publications.

1989 The Moral Grounds of Anthropological Inquiry: Towards an Anthropology of Ethics and an Ethics Grounded in Anthropological Theory. Keynote Address for the University of Minnesota Anthropology Club 11th Annual Undergraduate Spring Conference, May 19, 1989, Lake Itasca, Minnesota.

1991 Individuation of the Drives of Sex and Aggression in the Linguistic and Behavioral Repertoire of the Rungus. In Female and Male in Borneo: Contributions and Challenges to Gender Studies. Vinson H. Sutlive, Jr., ed. Pp. 57-120. Williamsburg: Borneo Research Council.

Clifford, James
1988 On Ethnographic Authority. In The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art. James Clifford, ed. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Pp. 21-54.

Devereux, George
1967 From Anxiety to Method in the Behavioral Sciences. The Hague: Mouton.

Ellen, R. F., ed.
1984 Ethnographic Research: A Guide to General Conduct. London: Academic Press.

Hallowell, A. Irving
1955 Culture and Experience. A. Irving Hallowell. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Herman, Steven G.
1986 The Naturalist’s Field Journal: A Manual of Instruction Based on a System Established by Joseph Grinnell. Vermillion: Buteo Books.

Werner, Oswald and Joann Fenton
1973 Method and Theory in Ethnoscience or Ethnoepistemology. In A Handbook of Method in Cultural Anthropology. Raoul Naroll and Ronald Cohen, eds. New York: Columbia University Press. Pp. 537-78.